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11 Introduction
The last few decades have seen the body of literature on inequality measures grow at an
impressive rate. Among the numerous innovations to take place in those years, the develop-
ment of new decomposition techniques has occupied a privileged place, see e.g. Bourguignon
(1979), Cowell (1980), Shorrocks (1980, 1982, 1999). Two types of decompositions have been
proposed.
({) The rst one is the subgroup (or subpopulation) decomposition. In this context,
inequality indices yield two components: a within-group term Iw, that measures inequality
within each group of the population, and a between-group term Ib, which gives an inequal-
ity in mean between groups, see e.g. Bourguignon (1979), Shorrocks (1980) and Cowell
(1980) for the generalized entropy inequality measure. Other well-known indices such as
the Gini index are also decomposable but in a dierent manner, see e.g. Bhattacharya and
Mahalanobis (1967), Rao (1969), Pyatt (1976), Silber (1989), Lerman and Yitzhaki (1991),
Lambert and Aronson (1993) and Dagum (1997) among others. Indeed, the structure of
the Gini index decomposition is dierent since it enables one to determine inequality within
groups (Gw) and inequality between groups (Ggb), where Ggb is an "across group" index of
inequality, such that G = Gw + Ggb.1
The index Ggb is dierent from Ib in the sense that the former gauges all pairs of
income dierences between agents' incomes across dierent groups, whereas the latter gives
the inequality between the mean incomes of the groups. Finally, these two measures of
inequality between groups provide decision makers a set of two tools to analyze inequalities
between subpopulations.
({{) The second technique of decomposition is the decomposition by income sources
(or factor components), which ascribes a part of the overall inequality to each income
constituent. The developments about this approach generated a better understanding of
the components issued from the Gini index, see e.g. Rao (1969), Fei, Ranis and Kuo
(1978), Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985), Shorrocks (1982), and Silber (1993). First, Rao (1969)
introduced the concept of pseudo-Gini which he used to decompose the overall Gini index as
a weighted average of pseudo-Gini indices by sources of income. This has been the starting
point of multiple empirical applications (see e.g. Fei, Ranis and Kuo (1978), Fields (1979)).
On the other hand, Shorrocks (1982) generalized the technique of source decomposition
1When at least two subgroup income distributions overlap, it can be shown that G = Gw + Gb + Gt,
where Ggb = Gb + Gt, and where Gb represents the inequality between mean incomes (in the sense of Ib)
and Gt the inequality of overlap, see e.g. Pyatt (1976), Silber (1989), Lerman and Yitzhaki (1991), Lambert
and Aronson (1993) and Dagum (1997) among others. The presence of the ambiguous term Gt, lead many
authors, such as Mookherjee and Shorrocks (1982), to reject the Gini index as a relevant decomposable
measure. Since then, researchers have employed the expression "between-group inequality" in order to
characterize Ib and the expression "across group inequality" (or "gross between-group inequality" in Dagum
(1997)) for other related but dierent measures such as Ggb. Notice that the Gt index is derived from the
concept of Gini's (1916) transvariation. The transvariation gauges between-group inequality generated from
the groups with lower mean incomes. This means that, when computing inequalities between two or more
groups, one assumes that some members of the poorest groups may earn incomes which are greater than
those of the members of richest groups.
2on the basis of six fundamental axioms in order to derive two fundamental indices: the
variance and the coecient of variation, for which the decomposed elements are identical
to those using the Shapley Value on these two indices (Shorrocks, 1999). On the contrary,
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) pointed out that the extended Gini index provides a desirable
decomposition by income sources since the overall extended Gini index provides a wide
range of information such as the Gini index for each source of incomes, each source's share
in the aggregate income, the correlation between income sources and individuals' ranking
within the distribution, and the social preference towards equality, which may be quite
important when conducting an empirical investigation since it may help to understand the
behavior of the decision maker.
Each type of decompositions motivated its own line of research, but since many years
a new eld has emerged from these two lines, that of multidimensional decomposition
(multi-decomposition for short). This technique aims at combining the two approaches
of decomposition in order to jointly identify all inequality components rather than getting
them separately through the two decompositions. One of the rst attempts is due to Yao
(1999) who provides, on the one hand, a subgroup Gini decomposition of the population
partitioned into rural and urban areas, and on the other hand, a source decomposition
of the within-group inequalities. The breakdown of the Gini coecient is thus not fully
accomplished since the between-group inequality is not decomposed by sources of income.
Shorrocks (1999) shows that the Shapley Value enables poverty and inequality measures
to be separated both by sources and subgroups. The robustness of this technique relies on
its perspective of generalizations. However, the obtained contributions are not necessarily
weighted averages of indices dened over the intersecting space of sources and subgroups.
The same problem exists with the multi-decomposition of the Gini index and the coecient
of variation squared derived by Mussard (2004, 2006) and Chameni (2007), respectively.
One of the aims of this paper is to propose a new Gini multi-decomposition which avoids
this problem.
Dagum's and Yitzhaki's contributions to the Gini decompositions are of great interest
since they have contributed to remove many doubts about the decomposability of the Gini
index (or the extended Gini index in other cases) in its various congurations. Hence, we
begin our study by proposing a rst-best Gini multi-decomposition based on the technique
introduced by these two authors in order to capture new inequality measures. These new
measures are related to the aversion of the decision maker towards inequality so that our
approach is robust over a large range of decision maker's behavior. Second-best Gini multi-
decomposition (not treated in this paper) are dened to be a breakdown of the Gini index,
which is not exactly a weighted average of Gini indices computed over the space of sources
and subgroups simultaneously (see Section 2 infra). In order to obtain a decomposition
relevant with the above remarks, and to nest it within the spirit of Lerman and Yitzhaki's
(1985) decomposition, the rst-best Gini multi-decomposition will be based on the particular
but necessary property of non-overlapping income source distributions, which helps to focus
3on the problem of how decision makers analyze the income repartition between poor and
non-poor people. This is another goal of our paper. Further, it must also be noted that the
validity of our multi-decomposition requires that the dierence between the mean income
from each source in any two population subgroup be of the same sign than the dierence
between the mean total income in these two subgroups. In a poor / non-poor context, this
requirement is generally not hard to satisfy but it should nevertheless be checked before
proceeding with the analysis.
To recap, the aim of our paper is four-fold:
 To obtain a multi-decomposition dependent on the social preference towards equality
of the social planner (or equivalently her aversion towards inequality).
 To provide a convenient decomposition to carry out robust poor / non-poor analysis
given any poverty line. Such partitioning of the population enables one to study a wide
range of poverty reducing policies.
 To estimate the contribution of each source, each group and each combination "source/group"
to the overall Gini index and calculate their condence intervals (asymptotic and bootstrap).
 To capture the impacts of tax reforms, for instance subsidizing a particular source of
income in any group in order to apprehend the impact on income inequality.
The literature is not silent about the fourth point. Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) analyse
marginal tax reforms through the use of Gini elasticities. These elasticities have been fur-
ther decomposed by Silber (1998) following the lines of Yitzhaki (2002).2 A marginal tax
reform gauges the impact of global transfers for a specic source of income (or consumption
expenditure) on the overall inequality, that is, the eect of the change in percentage terms
in a tax on a particular commodity on the Gini coecient of income inequality. Yitzhaki's
(2002) technique allows the decomposition of the Gini elasticity to be performed in order
to apprehend three aspects of elasticities: elasticity among rich, elasticity among poor,
elasticity between rich and poor. We follow this idea without exploring elasticities decom-
position. We examine marginal tax reforms which are consistent with the extended Gini
multi-decomposition implemented in partitioning the population in rich and poor people.
As the multi-decomposition yields within-group inequality decomposed by income sources
and between-group inequality decomposed by income sources, it provides, for policy pur-
poses, a way to simulate changes in percentage of a tax commodity in one group only (say
poor group) in order to capture the eect on within-group inequality or between-group
inequality. Hence, the dierence with Yitzhaki (2002) relies on the following points.
 The variations of inequalities are computed with the extended Gini index to perform
sensitivity analysis.3
 The variations of the within-group extended Gini index makes it possible to measure
the impact of subsidizing one source in a particular group (admittedly the poor one) on the
inequality of this group (and on the overall amount of the within-group inequality).
2Yitzhaki's decomposition was rst published as working paper in 1997 and published in 2002.
3Yitzhaki (2002, page 71, footnote 19) indicates that a way to increase the weight on poor people is to
use the extended Gini index.
4 Two between-group marginal tax reforms are constructed. The rst one yields the
impact of subsidizing one income source in the poor group on the inequality between poor
and rich (and the impact on the overall between-group inequality). The second one provides
a measure of the impact of subsidizing one source in both poor and rich groups on the
inequality between rich and poor (and on the overall amount of between-group inequality).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the concept of
multi-decomposition. Section 3 is devoted to the specication of the rst-best extended Gini
multi-decomposition. Section 4 deals with the derivation of the Gini variations from this
rst-best multi-decomposition. Section 5 presents an empirical application on Luxembourg
data showing, for instance, that subsidizing pension incomes in the poor group has an
important eect on the between-group inequality reduction. A brief conclusion follows in
Section 6.
2 The Gini Multi-decomposition: Notations and Concept
Let xik be the income of the ith individual i 2 f1;2;:::;ng belonging to the kth group
k k 2 f1;2;:::;Kg of a population divided in K groups. Suppose that total income is
disaggregated in sources and let x`
ik be the income from source ` of individual i, where
` 2 f1;2;:::;Lg.4 Let  be the average income over the whole population (of size n) and
let k be the average income of individuals in group k (of size nk).
The Gini multi-decomposition is a technique by which the subgroup decomposition
(Column Total) and the source decomposition (Row Total) are combined to produce a set
of new contribution indicators as depicted in Table 1.
Table 1: Structure of the Gini multi-decomposition
Sources !









. . . 











. . . 


















. . . 
. . . 
. . .
. . .








. . . 
. . . 
. . .
. . .


















4Notice that xik need not be the income of individual i and could just as well be his total consumption
in which case, x
`
ik would be his total consumption of good ` and all the analysis that follows would bear on
consumption rather than income inequality. In this respect, marginal changes in Gini (see Section 4 infra,
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985), Garner (1993)) are also of interest.
5As shown by Mussard (2006), the within- and across-group contribution indices for
income source `, respectively C`
kk and C`
kj, are atypical indices since they do not depend
on Gini indices for source ` in each group k and Gini indices for source ` across the
groups k and j, namely, G`
kk and G`
kj.5 The contribution indices are based on a dierent







combined indices measuring contributions to G which are:
 C`
kk, the contribution of source ` inequalities (e.g. wages) in group k to G ;
 C`
kj, the contribution of source ` inequalities across groups k and j to G.
Moreover, the multi-decomposition has the property of independence between the "marginal"
decompositions (that is, the decomposition only by income source or by group), mean-





as the most contributive index to G,
whereas the combination of the margins produces another source / group couple. However,
the technique may be viewed as a second-best approach since neither the contributions nor
the overall Gini index are expressed as a linear combination of within-group Gini coecients











. We address this issue in the next section.6
3 On an Extended Gini Multi-decomposition
Although our multi-decomposition aims at dealing with poor / non-poor income reparti-
tions, that is two groups, let us express our result for K non-overlapping income distribu-
















Following Dagum (1987), it is possible to measure inequalities between k and j using





r=1 jxik   xrjj
nknj (k + j)
: (2)
Furthermore, following Dagum (1997), the Gini index is a weighted average of inequalities
within groups and inequalities between groups.8 After some algebraic manipulations, we
5These Gini indices are computed on the intersecting space of sources and subgroups. This is not the
case when decompositions techniques are separately used.













properties are known and are desirable.
7When the Gini index is decomposed by groups, across-group inequality (Ggb) and between-group in-
equality (Gb) coincides if and only if groups' income distributions do not overlap. This is the case in our
multi-decomposition. Therefore, in the sequel, we use the expression between-group inequality.
8In Dagum's paper the mean income of the groups are ordered for ease of exposition. Let us recall that


















where Pk is the population share of group k (Pk :=
nk
n ), Skk denotes the income share of
group k (Skk :=
k
 ), and Skj is the joint income share of groups k and j (Skj :=
k+j
+ ).9
This result yields a within-group Gini index Gw and a between-group Gini index Ggb. In
what follows, we perform a second level of decomposition along the sources of income. For
this purpose, we use the technique introduced by Yitzhaki (1983).
Yitzhaki (1983) introduces the extended Gini index G(), which captures social judg-
ments such as social aversion to inequality:




 2 L(F)dF;  > 0; (4)
where L(F) is the traditional Lorenz curve and F is the cumulative distribution function
(c.d.f.) of the population's income.10 The higher  is, the greater the preference for equality.
For all  2 (0;1), there is preference for inequality. If  = 1, there is indierence for
inequality (G(1) is always 0). If  = 2 we get the standard Gini index (1) and if  > 2,
there is stronger preference for equality. Let G`() be the extended Gini index computed








where ` and F` are respectively the mean and c.d.f. of income source `. Let R`() be the













R`() is a Pearson-like coecient since its denominator is the covariance between the vector
of the `th source and the ranks of its elements in the distribution instead of a product of
standard deviations. Let S` :=
`
 be the income share of source `. Then, the extended




R`() G`() S`: (7)
9If the denominator of Skj is , one has to delete 2 before the double summation.
10As shown by Fei, Ranis, and Kuo (1978), F can be replaced by the individuals' position when they are
ranked by ascending order of incomes.
7In order to obtain the multi-decomposition, let us introduce the Gini-correlation index of






























k is the vector of source ` for group k and F`
k is the c.d.f. of source ` for group k
and `
k is the mean of source ` for group k. To permit R`
kk() and G`
kk() to be computed,
we impose that all vector of sources are nonnegative x`
k 2 R
nk
+ n f0nkg, 8k 2 f1;:::;Kg
and 8` 2 f1;:::;Lg where 0nk stands for the nil vector of size nk. This condition means
that one or many individuals may have a zero income source but groups with zero-equally




k be the `th








Now, suppose we have K non-overlapping subgroup income distributions. The Gini index













kj is the Gini index between groups k and j for source ` and S`
kj is the contri-
















It is worth mentioning that equation (11) and the following ones are valid if and only
if sgn(`
k   `
j) = sgn (k   j) for all ` 2 f1;2;:::;Lg and 8j 6= k 2 f1;2;:::;Kg.11
Substituting (9) and (11) in (3) and letting  = 2, one nds that the standard Gini index is
multi-decomposable in the sense that it is simultaneously decomposable by income sources

















2Pj Pk Skj S`
kj G`
kj: (13)
11In a poor / non-poor partition, the condition is usually easily satised, meaning that all mean income
sources are likely to be greater in the non-poor group than in the poor one. However, it may happen, for
very low income sources, that the mean of the poor is greater than the mean of the rich. In this case, the
method would be inapplicable.
8As can be seen in (4), the degree of inequality aversion only enters through its interaction
with the c.d.f. of incomes. In particular,  only aects G() through the weight that is given
to each Lorenz curve ordinate. Specically, it does not aect the value of these ordinates,
which represent the mean income share held by a percentage of the population. On the other
hand, non-overlapping subgroup distributions entail between-group inequalities depending
only on mean income shares. Thus, between-group inequalities do not depend on the degree
of inequality aversion. Hence, the Gini multi-decomposition (13) can naturally be extended


























The extended Gini (G()), the extended within-group Gini (Gw()), and the between-group
Gini (Ggb) can easily be broken down so that Table 1 is fully complete. The extended Gini
multi-decomposition then yields the contribution of inequality in group k due to source `
8k 2 f1;2;:::;Kg and 8` 2 f1;2;:::;Lg and the contribution of inequality between groups







jk = 2Pj Pk Skj S`
jk G`
kj: (15)
On the one hand, about the properties of the source contribution, Morduch and Sicular
(2002) and Wan (2002) introduce the uniform additions principle, postulating that for
any equally distributed income source, the corresponding contribution must be negative.
The negativity of a contribution is desirable (see Shorrocks (1983)). However referring to
Shorrocks (1982), it is neither necessary nor sucient in axiomatic purposes. Our approach
does not meet the uniform additions principle, but it satises the principle of normalisation
of distributions of equivalent incomes (see Shorrocks (1982)). That is, if a source is equally
distributed, then its contribution is nil. In a multi-decomposition framework, the within-
group contribution C`
kk satises this principle for source ` if the vector x`
k has constant
coordinates for all i and if x`
k 2 R
nk
+ n f0nkg. The between-group contribution C`
jk also
satises this condition if vectors x`
k and x`
j are equally and identically distributed (not
necessarily of the same size) and x`
k 2 R
nk
+ n f0nkg, x`
j 2 R
nj
+ n f0njg.12 The conditions
on f0nkg enable Eqs. (8)-(12) to be computed. Then, one has to be cautious with the
multi-decomposition applied in a poor/non-poor analysis since it may often happen that
households are totally poor according to some income sources (like investment, dividends,
capital gains, interest, rent, etc.). In this case x`
k = 0nk and most of the formulae become
inappropriate.13
On the other hand, one remarks that only within-group contributions (C`
kk();8 >
0;8`) depend on the aversion degree towards inequality. Accordingly, overall inequality may
12The same reasoning applies if the source ` is equally distributed for the whole population.
13We thank one referee for having pointed out to us this important remark.
9be seen as an increasing function of the deprivation feeling within each group.14 Indeed,
deprivation is closely related to social exclusion with respect to the reference group, namely,
the perception of group exclusion (see Bossert and D'Ambrosio (2006)). In a poor/non-poor
framework (see Section 4 infra), poor persons feel deprived or excluded only through their
evaluation of their own position in the group they belong to. This situation is also relevant
with the literature on poverty measurement, in which the level of poverty does not depend
on incomes above a predened poverty line (the Focus axiom). Therefore, poor individuals
are indierent to what happens in the rich group, and vice versa, so that a higher  aects
G() through Gw() only.15
4 Multi-decomposition and Tax Reforms
The impact of tax reforms on poverty or inequality indices yields decision makers the ability
to simulate transfers (see e.g. Duclos, Makdissi and Wodon (2005) for the case of direct
transfer reforms, Makdissi and Wodon (2007) to regulatory reforms). In this Section, we
study the eect of the change in the tax on a given commodity on the extended Gini
coecient (see also the technique initiated by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985)). Traditionally,
in the literature of inequality measurement, transfers are concerned with one income donor
and one income recipient in order to analyze the impact of such transfers on the overall
inequality. In contrast, the eect of marginal tax variations on commodities are equivalent
to global transfers in income source distributions. For instance, when the population is
partitioned in poor and non-poor groups, decision makers may be interested in capturing
the impact of a percentage change in each individual's income source ` on the inequality
in each group.16 These tax reforms can readily be computed in the case of the extended
Gini multi-decomposition. Suppose each individual's source ` in group k is multiplied by
e`












kk ()   Gkk ()

: (16)





kk (kk()   1); (17)
14See Yitzhaki (1979) for the intimate interrelation between the Gini index and concept of relative depri-
vation.
15Note however that deprivation between groups may be captured source by source as in Mussard (2006).
However, this component would be invariant with respect to the decision maker's behavior, whereas it aects
within-group deprivation.
16In what follows, we restrict our attention to marginal variations in the income source distributions
(which may be interpreted as marginal taxation). Indeed, marginal tax reforms are supposed not to alter
the composition of the poor and non-poor groups. This assumption allows us to avoid the use of dynamic









is the extended Gini elasticity within group k (see also Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1985, for
the denition). These marginal changes (G`
kk ();8 > 0;8` 2 f1;2;:::;Lg) are useful
indicators for the analysis of the impact of tax reforms intending to improve transfers
in particular groups or, if xik represents individual i's consumption, to subsidize some
commodities in order to reduce inequalities in another group.
As the multi-decomposition methodology is well suited to analyze the behavior of indi-
viduals when they dier in needs by means of between-group indicators, it may be of interest
to extend the notion of marginal changes when two groups are subsidized simultaneously.
For this purpose, it is possible to compute a between-group indicator to capture the eect
of the tax reform by assuming that source ` of each person belonging to groups k and j
is multiplied by e`













Such taxation schemes may be implemented to alleviate inequalities between poor and non-
poor groups. Alternatively, the technique may be employed to subsidize poor and extremely
poor groups in order to capture the eect on the inequalities between poor and extremely
poor persons.
In a similar manner, it may be interesting to measure the decline of inequalities between
k and j when poor people alone are receiving such transfers. Let K = 2 and assume
that k and j represent the poor and non-poor groups respectively and suppose that each
poor person's source ` is multiplied by e`










(1 + Gkj): (20)
Equation (20) implies that subsidizing source ` in the poor group always decreases inequal-
ities between poor and non poor.17
The above Gini variations allow to capture the impact of global transfers either on the
inequalities in one group or on the inequalities between two non-overlapping groups. We
now examine the possibility to subsidize the poor and to gauge inequality variations relevant
with the extended Gini multi-decomposition. Suppose that the decision maker intends to
subsidize the poor group k by increasing each poor person's source `. Then, measuring the
impact of this policy on G() necessitates that we evaluate the variation of the contributions
C`
kk() and C`
jk issued from the multi-decomposition.18 Suppose source ` is multiplied by
17Notice that all variations can be measured in proportion of Gkk() or Gkj in order to compute percent-
ages.
18This case was studied by Yitzhaki (2002) except we use a multidimensional extended Gini multi-
decomposition, and except we subsidize source ` for the poor group only, instead of subsidizing source `
for the entire population.
11e`


















































Thus, the impact of the change of source ` in group k on the overall inequality G()
is decomposed in two marginal changes. The rst one, G`
w, measures the impact of the


























The second one, G`
gb, measures the impact of the change of source ` in group k on the










(1 + 2PkSjkGjk): (23)
Finally, decision makers have the ability to subsidize poor groups to reduce poverty, but
this kind of policies have many implications on inequalities particularly on within- and
between-group inequality components as shown by equations (22) and (23).
5 Empirical Illustration
We illustrate the utility of the multi-decomposition using Luxembourg survey data from
the Panel Socio-Economique Liewen zu Letzebuerg II (PSELL II) 2004. Our data set is
composed of 2,295 households reporting positive incomes in at least one of 5 categories
which are dened in Table 2. We consider two groups of households: poor and non-poor
ones, where a household is considered poor if its total income is below 0.6 times the sample
median total income. This yields a poor group of 398 households and a non-poor group of
1,897 households.
Table 2: Income sources
Source 1 Wages and commercial incomes
Source 2 Total transfers income
Source 3 Unemployment insurance income
Source 4 Pension income
Source 5 Other incomes
Table 3 shows the estimated contributions to the Gini index when  = 2 (G(2) = 0:3094)
along with standard normal and bootstrap 95% condence intervals. The decomposition
by income sources indicates that almost all of the inequality comes from source 1 (0.2503).
12This is not surprising because this source is composed of all labour incomes, which account
for a large proportion of the total income of several households. The multi-decomposition
allows us to see that this source's contribution largely comes from within the non-poor
group (0.1620), although the between-group contribution is also quite large (0.0879).
The decomposition by groups reveals that practically all the inequality comes from
within the non-poor group (0.2007) and between the two groups (0.1072). Thus, it would
appear that there is very little inequality in the poor segment of the population, a lot in
the non-poor segment, which is mostly due to income source 1 but also to sources 2 and 5,
and also a lot between the poor and non-poor groups, due to the same sources.
It may at rst appear odd that some within-group contributions take negative values.






It therefore makes sense for the contributions of pension and unemployment incomes in
the non-poor group to be negative. Indeed, these are on average smaller than employment
income, which constitutes the larger share of total incomes, and people who receive them
usually are not working. Thus, individuals with positive pension or unemployment income
(x` > 0) are likely to be ranked in the lower part of the overall distribution (that is, they
have a 1 F close to 1). On the other hand, people who work typically have no pension or
unemployment insurance income (x` = 0) but their total income tends to be larger (they
have low 1   F). Hence, the covariance between (1   F) and x` is positive. The same
argument can be made for all   1 and a similar argument holds for all 0 <  < 1 (that
is, C`
kk(0:5) is positive whenever R`(0:5) is negative because G`
kk(0:5) is always negative).
It also makes a lot of intuitive sense. Indeed, when one income source representing a large
share of total income (here, source 1) is distributed with a certain degree of inequality, while
another less important source tends to contribute a larger share to the total income of people
with low income from that source, then this second income source tends to decrease total
inequality, which translates in a negative C`
kk. There is a number of situations in which
between-group contributions may also be negative. For example, when K = 2, if `
j < 0,
where j denotes the poor group, then C`
jk < 0.19
Table 3. Gini Contributions to G() ( = 2)
19Notice that the between-group contributions C
`
jk cannot be negative if and only if there are only two
groups of income earners. If K > 2, then between-group contributions may be negative.
13Poor Non-poor Between Sum
Source 1 0.0004 0.1620 0.0879 0.2503
(0.0000 , 0.0007) (0.1519 , 0.1722) (0.0839 , 0.0919)
[0.0000 , 0.0007] [0.1519 , 0.1723] [0.0839 , 0.0919]
Source 2 0.0002 0.0282 0.0114 0.0398
(0.0000 , 0.0004) (0.0166 , 0.0398) (0.0084 , 0.0143)
[0.0000 , 0.0004] [0.0154 , 0.0385] [0.0082 , 0.0143]
Source 3 -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0008 0.0002
(-0.0002 , -0.0001) (-0.0011 , 0.0001) (0.0001 , 0.0015)
[-0.0002 , -0.0001] [-0.0011 , 0.0001] [0.0000 , 0.0014]
Source 4 0.0010 -0.0089 0.0004 -0.0075
(0.0006 , 0.0013) (-0.0144 , -0.0034) (-0.0018 , 0.0025)
[0.0006 , 0.0013] [-0.0144 , -0.0035] [-0.0033 , 0.0007]
Source 5 0.0000 0.0199 0.0067 0.0266
(0.0000 , 0.0001) (0.0133 , 0.0265) (0.0052 , 0.0082)
[0.0000 , 0.0001] [0.0127 , 0.0261] [0.0051 , 0.0081]
Sum 0.0015 0.2007 0.1072 0.3094 = G(2)
Normal condence intervals in parenthesis
Bootstrap condence intervals in brackets, B=12 000
It is interesting to notice that the bootstrap and standard normal condence intervals are
almost identical for all contributions. This is an important result because it tells us some-
thing about the asymptotic characteristics of C`
kk and C`
jk. Indeed, although asymptotic
normality results are available for the standard Gini index G(2) (see, among others, David-
son (2007) and Cowell (1989)) or the extended Gini G() (see Barrett and Pendakur (1995))
no such results exist for the decomposition (3) nor, obviously, for the multi-decomposition
(14). Although no general conclusion may be drawn from them, the results in Table 3 (and
Table 4) indicate that the C`
jk's (for all j = k or j 6= k) may have asymptotically normal
distributions.
The second and third columns of Table 4 show that a higher level of inequality aversion
yields very similar results. The magnitude of all the contributions increase, but by dierent
factors. Since the Gini index with  = 4 puts more weight on low incomes (relatively to
 = 2), this reects the dierences in the depth of inequality (in the sense of the distance
between the income of the poorest members of a group and the income of other members
of this group) in each group for each income source. For example, the depth of inequality
seems to be greater for source 4 than for source 5 in the non-poor group, because the
contribution of source 4 increases by a much greater factor than that of source 5.
Table 4. Within-group contributions ( = 4 and  = 0:5)
14Poor ( = 4) Non-poor ( = 4) Poor ( = 0:5) Non-poor ( = 0:5)
Source 1 0.0009 0.2607 -0.0002 -0.2058
(0.0003 , 0.0014) (0.2464 , 0.2750) (-0.0007 , 0.0003) (-0.2548 , -0.1569)
[0.0003 , 0.0014] [0.2464 , 0.2748] [-0.0006 , 0.0004] [-0.2518 , -0.1534]
Source 2 0.0004 0.0376 0.0000 -0.2261
(0.0000 , 0.0007) (0.0253 , 0.0498) (-0.0002 , 0.0002) (-0.3525 , -0.0997)
[0.0000 , 0.0007] [0.0243 , 0.0488] [-0.0002 , 0.0002] [-0.4093 , -0.1805]
Source 3 -0.0004 -0.0008 0.0000 0.0008
(-0.0006 , -0.0001) (-0.0020 , 0.0005) (0.0000 , 0.0002) (0.0004 , 0.0012)
[-0.0005 , -0.0001] [-0.0020 , 0.0005] [0.0000 , 0.0002] [0.0004 , 0.0012]
Source 4 0.0018 -0.0202 -0.0010 0.0021
(0.0013 , 0.0024) (-0.0303 , -0.0101) (-0.0016 , -0.0005) (-0.0089 , 0.0130)
[0.0013 , 0.0024] [-0.0302 , -0.0102] [-0.0018 , -0.0007] [-0.0074 , 0.0148]
Source 5 0.0000 0.0247 0.0000 -0.0785
(0.0000 , 0.0001) (0.0176 , 0.0318) (-0.0001 , 0.0000) (-0.1273 , -0.0296)
[0.0000 , 0.0001] [0.0171 , 0.0312] [-0.0001 , 0.0000] [-0.1235 , -0.0265]
Normal condence intervals in parenthesis
Bootstrap condence intervals in brackets, B=12,000
Things are quite dierent when there is preference for inequality (columns 4 and 5).
The rst change is that all the statistically signicant contributions have an opposite sign
compared with those computed with inequality aversion ( = 2 and  = 4). This is not a
surprise and conrms that the multi-decomposition works well. The contribution of source
2 in the non-poor group, which was modest with inequality aversion, is now very large
and comparable to that or source 1. Further, this is the only case where the bootstrap
condence interval substantially diers from the normal one. It is possible that this results
from the fact that  = 0:5 puts more weight on large incomes and may have amplied a
heavy tail eect for this source. This conjecture is based on the fact that income source 2
in the non-poor group has a much higher kurtosis ( = 439) than any other income source-
group combination ( = 198 for non-poor source 5 is the second highest). It is well known
that the standard bootstrap can be quite inaccurate, and even invalid, when it is used with
data from a distribution with heavy tails (of course, standard normal approximations are
also quite inaccurate in such cases). Bootstrap methods designed to yield valid and more
reliable nite sample inferences for inequality measures in data sets with heavy tails exist,
see Davidson and Flachaire (2007). Adapting those to the multi-decomposition is beyond
the scope of this article and is left to future work.
The within- and between-group marginal changes (equations 16, 19 and 20) are dis-
played in Table 5. Several interesting results are worth highlighting. In particular, the
table suggests that subsidizing income sources 1 and 4 in the poor group has an impor-
tant inequality reducing eect through the between-group marginal variation ~ G`
kj. Also,
an inequality averse government could signicantly reduce within-group inequality by, for
example, subsidizing members of the poor group through an increase of their incomes from
source 1 or taxing income source 1 of members of the non-poor group. In addition, a sub-
stantial between-group inequality reduction is achieved by increasing source 4 incomes in
both groups simultaneously.
15Some further insight about the Gini variations may be gained from a close examination
of the results in Table 5. For instance, notice that, for wages and commercial incomes
(source 1), G`
kj > 0 while e G`
kj < 0. This mainly reects the fact that 57% of the members
of the poor group have no source 1 income while only 18% of the members of the non-poor
group are in that situation. Thus, a policy which increases income source 1 for all members
of the population has a much larger impact on the mean income of the non-poor group than
on that of the poor group, and consequently has a positive net eect on between-group
inequality. Hence, G`
kj is positive. On the other hand, increasing source 1 incomes only
for members of the poor group obviously reduces between-group inequality, hence e G`
kj is
negative.


















Source 1 0.0213 0.1735 -0.0134 0.0361 -0.0119 0.0762 0.1181 -0.1379
Source 2 0.0122 -0.2171 0.0019 0.0064 0.0000 0.0033 -0.0060 -0.0504
Source 3 0.0100 0.0040 -0.0159 -0.0018 -0.0362 -0.0028 -0.0014 -0.0102
Source 4 -0.0405 0.1105 0.0251 -0.0542 0.0449 -0.0904 -0.1152 -0.1778
Source 5 -0.0029 -0.0709 0.0022 0.0136 0.0032 0.0137 0.0117 -0.0063
Table 6 provides Gini variations measuring the impact of source changes for the poor
group on overall inequality (21), on within-group inequalities (22), and on between-group
inequalities (23). According to the numbers depicted there, increasing poor group's pensions
(source 4) yields the most important reduction of between-group inequalities, of within-
group inequalities (for  = 2 and  = 4), and of the overall inequality. Pensions are also
the most contributive source that raises within-group inequalities when there is preference
for inequality ( = 0:5).
Finally, increasing any one of the poor group's income source decreases inequality no
matter what the degree of inequality aversion is. The main driving force of this is the
between-group eect. In particular, the between-group variations are strong enough to oset
the positive within-group variation G`
w(0:5), so that the impact on the overall inequality is
always negative.













Source 1 -0.0228 0.0123 -0.0046 -0.0066 -0.0105 -0.0274 -0.0294
Source 2 -0.0083 0.0045 -0.0016 -0.0024 -0.0038 -0.0099 -0.0107
Source 3 -0.0017 0.0010 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0022 -0.0026
Source 4 -0.0294 0.0150 -0.0054 -0.0078 -0.0144 -0.0348 -0.0372
Source 5 -0.0010 0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0012 -0.0013
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a rst-best Gini multi-decomposition, that is, a multi-decomposition
in which the overall Gini ratio is a weighted average of Gini indices per sources and per
groups, which is valid whenever subgroup income distributions are non-overlapping. This
16method is well suited to analyze the sources of inequality in a population decomposed in a
poor/non-poor manner. In particular, it allows decision makers to easily evaluate taxation
schemes, that is, global change in the distribution of source `, either in a rich group or
a poor group. It can also be used to measure the eects on between-group inequalities
resulting from a change in income source `. A limitation of the multi-decomposition is that
it may only be applied to non-overlapping distributions and when the dierence between
the mean income from each source in any two population subgroup is of the same sign than
the dierence between the mean total income in these two subgroups.
In a general manner, the multi-decomposition is a useful property of the extended Gini
that helps to deal with the heterogeneity of the agents. Indeed, the fact that a progres-
sive transfer diminishes the overall Gini index is a well-known result in the literature on
inequality measurement. Nevertheless, it is not clear how between-group inequalities are
aected by a change in a given source of income (or by the subsidization of a given commod-
ity). In this respect, the between-group Gini variations are an important addition to the
applied economist toolkit since they measure the impact of tax reforms on between-group
inequalities and overall inequality.
Appendix
In this appendix, we provide guidelines to derive the expressions of Gini variations (16),
(19), (20), (21) and (22).
Equation (16):
This result was established by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985). They do not provide the
demonstration since it is quite straightforward. Indeed, remark that R`
kk () and G`
kk ()
are invariant after multiplying each source ` of group k by e`
kk. Then, taking the derivative
of S`







! 1 and remembering
that e`
kk ! 1+ gives the desired result. 
Equation (19):
Consider a transfer of e`




























































Taking the derivative of (A1) with respect to e`
kj, and that of (A2) 8h 6= ` 2 f1;2;:::;Lg
17with respect to e`
kj, and then letting e`
kj ! 1+ yields















which helps to complete (19). 
Equation (20):
Consider a transfer of e`






















































j. Remembering that e`




















which helps to nd (20). 
Equation (22):
After the transfer, with e`
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